Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Implementation and Status

Baird Webel
Specialist in Financial Economics

The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343) in October 2008. EESA was enacted to address an ongoing financial crisis that reached near-panic proportions in September 2008. The act granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to either purchase or insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets owned by financial institutions. This authority was granted for up to two years from the date of enactment and was very broad. In particular, the definitions of both “troubled asset” and “financial institution” allowed the Secretary wide leeway in deciding what assets might be purchased or guaranteed and what might qualify as a financial firm.

The financial crisis grew out of an unprecedented housing boom that turned into a housing bust. Much of the lending for housing during the boom was based on asset-backed securities that used the repayment of housing loans as the basis of these securities. As housing prices fell and mortgage defaults increased, these securities became illiquid and fell sharply in value, causing capital losses for firms holding them. Uncertainty about future losses reduced many firms’ access to private liquidity, with the loss in liquidity being catastrophic in some cases. September 2008 saw the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the near collapse of AIG, which was saved only by an $85 billion loan from the Federal Reserve. There was widespread lack of trust in the financial markets as participants were unsure which firms might be holding so-called toxic assets that might now be worth much less than previously estimated, and thus making these firms unreliable counterparties in financial transactions. This prevented firms from accessing credit markets to meet their liquidity needs.

As EESA moved through Congress, most attention was focused on the idea of the government purchasing mortgage-related toxic assets, thus alleviating the widespread uncertainty and suspicion by cleaning up bank balance sheets. The initial TARP Capital Purchase Program, however, directly added capital onto banks’ balance sheets through preferred share purchases, rather than removing assets that had become liabilities through purchasing mortgage-related assets. Several other TARP programs followed, including an asset guarantee program; programs designed to spur consumer and business lending; financial support for companies such as AIG, GM, and Chrysler; and programs to aid homeowners at risk of foreclosure. Eventually, the Public-Private Investment Program resulted in the purchase of some mortgage-related assets, but this has remained a relatively small part of TARP. Most of the TARP programs are now closed.

With the immediate crisis subsiding through 2009, congressional attention to financial services turned largely to consider broad regulatory changes. The resulting Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111- 203) amended the TARP authority, including (1) reduction of the overall amount to $475 billion; (2) removal of the ability to reuse TARP funds that had been repaid; and (3) removal of the authority to create new TARP programs or initiatives. The original TARP authority to purchase new assets or enter into new contracts expired on October 3, 2010. Outlays under the existing contracts, however, may continue through the life of these contracts. Overall budget-cost estimates for TARP have decreased significantly since the passage of EESA, with the latest Congressional Budget Office estimates foreseeing $21 billion in costs and the latest Office of Management and Budget estimates foreseeing $47 billion in costs. Most of these costs are from aid for homeowners, for the insurer AIG, and for U.S. automakers. The assistance to banks is generally showing a gain for the government. In the 113th Congress, oversight of TARP has continued, including a hearing held by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.


Date of Report: June 27, 2013
Number of Pages: 30
Order Number: R41427
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Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies

Robert Jay Dilger
Senior Specialist in American National Government

Eugene Boyd
Analyst in Federalism and Economic Development Policy

Block grants are a form of grant-in-aid that the federal government uses to provide state and local governments a specified amount of funding to assist them in addressing broad purposes, such as community development, social services, public health, or law enforcement.

Block grant advocates argue that block grants increase government efficiency and program effectiveness by redistributing power and accountability through decentralization and partial devolution of decision-making authority from the federal government to state and local governments. Advocates also view them as a means to reduce the federal deficit. For example, Representative Paul Ryan, chair of the House Committee on the Budget, has recommended that the federal share of Medicaid be converted into a block grant “tailored to meet each state’s needs” as a means to improve “the health-care safety net for low-income Americans” and to “save $810 billion over 10 years.”

Block grant critics argue that block grants can undermine the achievement of national objectives and can be used as a “backdoor” means to reduce government spending on domestic issues. For example, opponents of converting Medicaid into a block grant argue that “block granting Medicaid is simply code for deep, arbitrary cuts in support to the most vulnerable seniors, individuals with disabilities, and low-income children.” Block grant critics also argue that the decentralized nature of block grants makes it difficult to measure block grant performance and to hold state and local government officials accountable for their decisions.

Block grants, which have been a part of the American federal system since 1966, are one of three general types of grants-in-aid programs: categorical grants, block grants, and general revenue sharing. These grants differ along three dimensions: the range of federal control over who receives the grant; the range of recipient discretion concerning aided activities; and the type, number, detail, and scope of grant program conditions.

Categorical grants can be used only for a specifically aided program and usually are limited to narrowly defined activities; legislation generally details the program’s parameters and specifies the types of funded activities. There are four types of categorical grants: project categorical grants, formula-project categorical grants, formula categorical grants, and open-end reimbursement categorical grants.

Project categorical grants and general revenue sharing represent the ends of a continuum on the three dimensions differentiating grant types, with block grants being at the mid-point. However, there is some overlap among grant types in the middle of the continuum. For example, some block grants have characteristics normally associated with formula categorical grants. This overlap, and the variation in characteristics among block grants, helps to explain why there is some disagreement concerning precisely what is a block grant, and how many of them exist.

This report provides an overview of the six grant types, provides criteria for defining a block grant and uses those criteria to provide a list of current block grants, examines competing perspectives concerning the use of block grants versus other grant mechanisms to achieve national goals, provides an historical overview of the role of block grants in American federalism, and examines recent changes to existing block grants and proposals to create new ones.


Date of Report: June 26, 2013
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: R40486
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Small Business Size Standards: A Historical Analysis of Contemporary Issues

Robert Jay Dilger
Senior Specialist in American National Government

Small business size standards are of congressional interest because the standards determine eligibility for receiving Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance as well as federal contracting and tax preferences. Although there is bipartisan agreement that the nation’s small businesses play an important role in the American economy, there are differences of opinion concerning how to define them. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards for determining eligibility for federal small business assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant’s maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes.

The SBA’s industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,047 industrial classifications in 18 sub-industry activities described in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The size standards are based on one of the following five measures: number of employees, average annual receipts in the previous three years, asset size, annual megawatt hours of electric output in the preceding fiscal year, or a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. Overall, the SBA currently classifies about 97% of all employer firms as small. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts.

The SBA has always based its size standards on economic analysis of each industry’s overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA’s size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members concerned that the size standards may not adequately target assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small.

During the 111th Congress, P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs. It also established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application. It also required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA’s industry size standards every 18 months.

This report provides a historical examination of the SBA’s size standards, and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses H.R. 585, the Small Business Size Standard Flexibility Act of 2011, which would have authorized the SBA’s Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard proposed by a federal agency if it deviates from the SBA’s size standards. The SBA’s Administrator currently has that authority. It also discusses P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which requires the SBA to make available a justification when establishing or approving a size standard that the size standard is appropriate for each individual industry classification. It addresses the SBA’s recent practice of combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics.


Date of Report: June 20, 2013
Number of Pages: 39
Order Number: R40860
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Compensated Work Sharing Arrangements (Short-Time Compensation) as an Alternative to Layoffs

Julie M. Whittaker
Specialist in Income Security

Short-time compensation (STC) is a program within the federal-state unemployment compensation system. In the 25 states and the District of Columbia that have enacted STC programs, workers whose hours are reduced under a formal work sharing plan may be compensated with STC, which is a regular unemployment benefit that has been pro-rated for the partial work reduction.

Although the terms work sharing and short-time compensation are sometimes used interchangeably, work sharing refers to any arrangement under which workers’ hours are reduced in lieu of a layoff. Under a work sharing arrangement, a firm faced with the need to downsize temporarily chooses to reduce work hours across the board for all workers instead of laying off a smaller number of workers. For example, an employer might reduce the work hours of the entire workforce by 20%, from five to four days a week, in lieu of laying off 20% of the workforce.

Employers have used STC combined with work sharing arrangements to reduce labor costs, sustain morale compared to layoffs, and retain highly skilled workers. Work sharing can also reduce employers’ recruitment and training costs by eliminating the need to recruit new employees when business improves. On the employee’s side, work sharing spreads more moderate earnings reductions across more employees—especially if work sharing is combined with STC—as opposed to imposing significant hardship on a few. Many states also require that employers who participate in STC programs continue to provide health insurance and retirement benefits to work sharing employees as if they were working a full schedule.

Work sharing and STC cannot, however, avert layoffs or plant closings if a company’s financial situation is dire. In addition, some employers may choose not to adopt work sharing because laying off workers may be a less expensive alternative. This may be the case for firms whose production technologies make it expensive or impossible to shorten the work week. For other firms, it may be cheaper to lay off workers than to continue paying health and pension benefits on a full-time equivalent basis. Work sharing arrangements in general also redistribute the burden of unemployment from younger to older employees, and for this reason the arrangements may be opposed by workers with seniority who are less likely to be laid off.

From the perspective of state governments, concerns about the STC program have included the program’s high administrative costs. Massachusetts has made significant strides in automating STC systems and reducing costs, but many other states still manage much of the STC program on paper.

Currently, 25 states and the District of Columbia have enacted STC programs to support work sharing arrangements. Through the end of 2008, the STC program rarely reached 1% of unemployment claims paid annually across the United States. This percentage peaked at nearly 3% in 2010 and has since fallen to 1% in 2012.The reasons for low take-up of the STC program are not completely clear, but key causes would appear to include the fact that fewer than one half of states have STC programs and ambiguity in the 1992 federal law that authorized STC.

Congress passed P.L. 112-96 in February 2012 to resolve ambiguities in the definition of STC and to provide temporary federal funding to states that have existing STC programs or that enter into an agreement with the U.S. Secretary of Labor.


Date of Report: June 19, 2013
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R40689
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A Brief Overview of Business Types and Their Tax Treatment

Mark P. Keightley
Specialist in Economics

In the United States, how a business is taxed at the federal level is partly dependent on how it is organized. The income of subchapter C corporations, also known as “regular” corporations, is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level according to the individual tax rates when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are recognized. This leads to the so-called “double taxation” of corporate income. Businesses that choose any other form of organization are, in general, not subject to the corporate income tax. Instead, the income of these businesses passes through to their owners and is taxed according to individual income tax rates. Examples of these alternative “pass-through” forms of organization include sole proprietorships, partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and limited liability companies.

This report summarizes the general tax treatment of corporate and pass-through businesses. The intent is to introduce those who are unfamiliar with the current U.S. business tax environment to the basics of corporate and pass-through taxation. Understanding how various businesses are taxed provides a starting point from which one can evaluate current and future proposals to change the taxation of corporations and pass-throughs. Additionally, since pass-through income is typically taxed only at individual income tax rates, this report is also a useful starting point for understanding the effects on pass-through businesses from a change to individual income tax rates. A list of related CRS products on business taxation may be found at the end of the report.


Date of Report: June 12, 2013
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: R43104
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