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Friday, September 28, 2012

Child Custody and Support: Frequently Asked Questions



Alison M. Smith
Legislative Attorney

Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field of domestic relations. Generally, state policy guides these decisions. Despite the lack of direct authority to legislate domestic relations issues, Congress continues to enact federal laws that indirectly affect family law questions concerning child custody and support. This report answers questions frequently asked regarding the interplay between federal and state laws governing these areas.


Date of Report: August 17, 2012
Number of Pages: 9
Order Number: RS21091
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Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act: A Primer



Benjamin Collins
Analyst in Labor Policy

Enacted by the 100th Congress, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act requires qualified employers that intend to carry out plant closings or mass layoffs to provide 60 days’ notice to affected employees, states, and localities. The purpose of the notice to workers is to allow them to seek alternative employment, arrange for retraining, and otherwise adjust to employment loss. The purpose of notifying states and localities is to allow them to promptly provide services to the dislocated workers and otherwise prepare for changes in the local labor market.

The WARN Act applies to employers with at least 100 or more full-time employees or equivalents. Federal, state, and local government employers are not subject to the act.

Broadly speaking, there are three types of events that require notification under the WARN Act. Each of these events is limited to a single site of employment; employment losses by a single employer across multiple sites are not aggregated. Events that trigger the requirements of the WARN Act are


  • a plant closing resulting in employment losses of at least 50 employees;
     
  • a mass layoff of at least 50 employees where the employment loss consists of at least 33% of employment at the site; or
  • a mass layoff with an employment loss of 500 or more at a single site of employment, regardless of its proportion of total employment at the site or if the employment loss is part of a plant closing. 

For the purposes of the WARN Act, an employment loss is defined as an involuntary termination, layoff exceeding six months, or a reduction in hours worked exceeding 50% for each of six consecutive months. In addition to the three events described above, an employer may also be subject to the WARN Act if it engages in several layoffs during a 90-day period that, in aggregate, meet the criteria of an applicable event. Short-term layoffs that are later extended to six months or more may also trigger WARN Act requirements.

The act and accompanying regulations also specify situations in which an otherwise covered employer may be exempt from WARN Act requirements. Generally, these exceptions relate to unanticipated situations such as unforeseeable business circumstances or natural disasters.

The WARN Act is enforced through the federal court system. While the Department of Labor is permitted to establish regulations related to the act and offer non-binding guidance to employers and workers, all penalties and settlements are administered through the courts.

This report does not provide information on how the WARN Act may apply to government contractors affected by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). CRS issued a Congressional Distribution memorandum that discusses this issue on July 18, 2012. The memorandum was written by Benjamin Collins and Jon O. Shimabukuro and is available from either author.



Date of Report: September 10, 2012
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: R42693
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Housing Issues in the 112th Congress



Katie Jones, Coordinator
Analyst in Housing Policy

As the 112th Congress began, the economy was no longer officially in recession. However, housing markets remain fragile, many economic indicators remain weak, and home foreclosure rates remain high. Against this backdrop, the 112th Congress has considered a number of housingrelated issues. Broadly speaking, these issues include long-term questions related to reforms to the housing finance system, short-term concerns related to ongoing turmoil in housing markets, perennial issues related to housing assistance programs, and possible reductions in funding for housing programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

Given the role that housing played in the recent economic downturn, Congress has expressed interest in reforming the housing finance system to help protect the economy from similar problems in the future. In this vein, the 112th Congress has begun to consider long-term questions about the government’s role in housing finance going forward. Such questions include the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) currently in government conservatorship, and the role of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The 112th Congress has also exercised its oversight powers with regard to the implementation of housing- and mortgage-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), which was enacted during the 111th Congress. Such provisions include ability to repay standards that apply to mortgage originators and risk retention standards that apply to asset securitizers. Many Members of Congress have expressed concern about the implications that some of these provisions could have for private mortgage lending and access to mortgage credit.

At the same time, the ongoing effects of the recent economic turmoil on consumers and housing markets raise questions about whether further government intervention is warranted in the short term to address ongoing foreclosure issues or to stimulate housing demand. The housing markets’ fragility has also led to debates about whether policy options considered by the 112th Congress to reduce government involvement in the mortgage market would have negative effects on the housing recovery.

Concerns about the nation’s budget deficit have led to increased calls for reduced government spending, and an environment of fiscal austerity will likely have implications for housing-related programs and activities along with other domestic discretionary programs. A law providing fullyear FY2011 appropriations was not enacted until several months into the 112th Congress, and that law included cuts to several HUD programs, including reduced funding for the Community Development Block Grant (CDGB) and HOME programs. Appropriations for FY2012 included further cuts to housing programs, although some specific programs saw increases in funding. The 112th Congress has also considered perennial issues related to housing for low-income and other vulnerable populations, including possible reforms to the public housing and Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher programs. The debate over the future of federal housing assistance programs has been affected, and will likely continue to be affected, by both the fiscal environment and the ongoing effects of the recent recession and turmoil in U.S. housing markets.

This report provides a brief summary of major housing issues that have been active in the 112th Congress. It does not provide comprehensive coverage of the issues or closely track active legislation, but it includes references to related CRS products that offer more detailed information and analysis.



Date of Report: September 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 31
Order Number: R42145
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TARP Assistance for the U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry: Unwinding the Government Stake in GMAC



Baird Webel
Specialist in Financial Economics

Bill Canis
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business


Ally Financial, formerly known as General Motors Acceptance Corporation or GMAC, provides auto financing, insurance, online banking, and mortgage and commercial financing. For most of its history, it was a subsidiary of General Motors Corporation and it still provides significant financing both for GM vehicles and for GM dealers. Like some of the automakers, it faced serious financial difficulties due to a downturn in the market for automobiles during the 2008- 2009 financial crisis and recession, while also suffering from large losses in the mortgage markets. With over 90% of all U.S. passenger vehicles financed or leased, GMAC’s ability to lend, or inability to lend, was particularly important to GM’s retail sales and dealer-financing capabilities.

The Bush and Obama Administrations used the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to fund assistance for the U.S. auto industry, concluding that the failure of one or two large U.S. automakers would cause additional layoffs at a time of already high unemployment, prompt difficulties and failures in other parts of the economy, and disrupt other markets. The decision to aid the auto industry was not without controversy, with questions raised as to the legal basis for the assistance and the manner in which it was carried out. The nearly $80 billion in TARP assistance for the auto industry included approximately $17.2 billion for GMAC.

The government’s aid for GMAC was accomplished primarily through U.S. Treasury purchases of the company’s preferred shares. Many of these preferred shares were later converted into common equity, resulting in the federal government acquiring a 73.8% ownership stake. This conversion from preferred to common equity significantly changed the outlook for the future government recoupment of TARP assistance. Whether the government will recoup all or most of these funds now depends largely on the future market value of the government’s ownership stake. If the government’s common equity ends up being worth less than the assistance provided, the company has no responsibility going forward to compensate the government for the difference. Conversely, if the common equity ends up being worth more than the assistance, the gain from this difference accrues to the U.S. Treasury (and is used to pay down the national debt as specified in the TARP statute). In addition to TARP assistance, during the financial crisis in 2008, GMAC converted from an industrial loan company into a bank holding company, an expedited conversion that was permitted by the Federal Reserve (Fed) due to prevailing emergency conditions in the financial markets. This change increased access to government assistance, including Fed lending facilities and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guarantees, while also increasing regulatory oversight of the company.

In March 2011, Ally Financial (GMAC having changed its name in 2010) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for an initial public offering (IPO) of shares, which it expected to launch in the second quarter of 2011. The IPO, however, was postponed because of stock market volatility and poor performance of Ally Financial’s residential mortgage unit. It is unclear whether an IPO will eventually occur or whether the government will dispose of its share of Ally Financial in some other way.



Date of Report: September 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 16
Order Number: R41846
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Unemployment Insurance: Legislative Issues in the 112th Congress



Julie M. Whittaker
Specialist in Income Security

Katelin P. Isaacs
Analyst in Income Security


The 112th Congress may consider a number of issues related to currently available unemployment insurance programs: Unemployment Compensation (UC), temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), and Extended Benefits (EB). With the national unemployment rate predicted to remain high into next year, the increased demand for regular and extended unemployment benefits will continue. At the same time, the authorization for several key unemployment insurance provisions is temporary and will expire. For instance, the EUC08 program, which currently provides the bulk of extended unemployment benefits, is scheduled to expire the week ending on or before January 2, 2013. The 100% federal financing of the EB program will expire December 31, 2012. The option for states to use three-year EB trigger lookbacks expires the week ending on or before December 31, 2012. In addition, a temporary 0.2% federal unemployment tax (FUTA) surtax expired at the end of June 2011.

The 112th Congress faces these expirations as well as other likely unemployment insurance policy issues, including unemployment insurance financing. In addition, recent policy discussions have focused on the appropriate length and availability conditions of unemployment benefits.

This report provides a brief overview of the three unemployment insurance programs—UC, EUC08, and EB—that may currently pay benefits to eligible unemployed workers. This report also discusses relevant legislation introduced in the 112th Congress: specifically, H.R. 1745, S. 386, H.R. 650, H.R. 589, H.R. 1663, H.R. 235, S. 310, H.R. 569, H.R. 2001, H.R. 2120, H.R. 2137, H.R. 2731, H.R. 2806, H.R. 2868, S. 1743, H.R. 3346, S. 1804, S. 1826, H.R. 3427, S. 1885, S. 1931, S. 1944, H.R. 3598, H.R. 3601, H.R. 3630, H.R. 3615, H.R. 3638, H.R. 3743, H.R. 494, S. 2095, S. 2081, a proposal outlined in the President’s Budget Proposal for FY2013, as well as the President’s American Jobs Act of 2011 proposal (introduced in Congress as S. 1549, H.R. 12, and S. 1660). This report also discusses the implications for the UI programs with respect to provisions in H.R. 2693, S.Amdt. 581 to S. 1323, P.L. 112-25, P.L. 112-40, P.L. 112-78, and P.L. 112-96.



Date of Report: September 12, 2012
Number of Pages: 27
Order Number: R41662
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